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Challenges in Identifying Binding Martens Clause 
Rules from the ‘Dictates of the Public Conscience’ to 
Protect the Environment in Non-International 
Armed Conflict 
Abstract 
 
This article begins to move the debate on the Martens Clause forward by examining issues 
regarding the identification and verification of Martens Clause rules based on the dictates of 
the public conscience which protect the environment in non-international armed conflict. The 
research in this article is a starting point for a new wave of Martens Clause scholarship to 
enhance the clarity, certainty, breadth and relevance of the laws of non-international armed 
conflict going forward. As such, this research lays the necessary foundation for future debates 
to take place on the precise nature and content of specific Martens Clause norms that protect 
the environment in non-international armed conflict.  
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Introduction 
In 1899, the Martens Clause introduced into the laws of armed conflict a paradigm-shifting 
presumption which indicated that conduct on the battlefield would not be permitted per se 
just because of the absence of a specific prohibition. Martens Clause norms are inherently 
transient in nature, having the power to ‘justify a method of warfare in one age and prohibit it 
in another.’1 The Martens Clause continues to be relevant because methods and means of 
                                                          
1 International Court of Justice, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion’ [1996] 
I.C.J. Reports 226. This position echoes the oral submission made by Australia during the public sitting of the 
warfare evolve all the time, often rapidly, and it is impossible for international law to keep 
pace with this rate of change.2 The extent to which the environment is both a cause and 
casualty of contemporary armed conflict is a good example of changes in the nature of 
warfare in recent times that are not reflected in the laws that apply.3 Significantly, there is no 
provision within the laws of non-international armed conflict – the most prevalent type of 
armed conflict in the world today - directly protecting the environment or prohibiting 
environmental damage. As such the Martens Clause is frequently raised as a remedy for this 
present gap in the law.4  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons - ‘Of course, neither the concept of 
“humanity”, nor the “dictates of public conscience” are static. Conduct which might have been considered 
acceptable by the international community earlier this century might be condemned as inhumane by the 
international community today.’ Oral Submission by Australia, Public Sitting of the International Court of 
Justice, Request for Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Verbatim Record 
30 October 1995, Peace Palace, The Hague, 39. Australia further submitted that ‘In line with such changes in 
the attitude of the world community, over time the permissible uses of one particular type of weapon may be 
progressively restricted, until finally prohibited altogether.’ Oral Submission by Australia, Public Sitting of the 
International Court of Justice, Request for Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Verbatim Record 30 October 1995, Peace Palace, The Hague, 40 
2 James D Fry, ‘Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods and Means of Warfare: Cave Combat and 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 453, 455. Fry aptly 
surmises that ‘technology advances at breakneck speed. Humanity scrambles to keep up, relying on what some 
consider “woefully outdated” documents and standards. Is international humanitarian law doomed forever to lag 
behind on account of its inelasticity? ... Indeed, context-based legal reviews of methods and means of warfare 
can help close loopholes and ensure that the spirit of these laws prevails’. 
3 Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch United Nations Environment Programme, ‘Protecting the 
Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law’ (United Nations 
Environment Programme 2009) 10. ‘Yet internal conflicts are the most strongly linked to the environment, with 
recent research suggesting that at least forty percent of all intrastate conflicts over the last sixty years have a link 
to natural resources.’ 
4 See United Nations Environment Programme, supra n. 3, 46–47. See also Carl E Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in 
(Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed Conflict’ (2001) 25 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 695, 793.; Michael Bothe and others, ‘International Law Protecting the Environment During 
Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 569, 589. 
 
The Martens Clause is a sui generis source of international law.5 As Schmitt surmises, 
“during the evolution of prescriptive norms…[a]s the law proper grapples with how to handle 
environmental issues, the “laws of humanity” and “dictates of public conscience” will 
theoretically serve to ensure a modicum of protection.”6 But identifying specific Martens 
Clause rules that put belligerent parties on notice that a certain level or certain type of 
environmental damage is prohibited is extremely difficult – indeed no concrete examples of 
environmental-Martens Clause norms can be found in the scholarship to date on this subject. 
If parties to an armed conflict cannot figure out with sufficient foresight, precision and 
certainty what Martens Clause-based rules apply to them in any given situation, the entire 
purpose of the Clause is frustrated. Moreover, enforcing rules which are impossible to 
identify would be Kafkaesque and in breach of the principle of legality under international 
law.  
 
                                                          
5 In the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Judge 
Shahabuddeen insisted in his dissenting opinion that the Martens Clause was ‘its own self-sufficient and 
conclusive authority… in cases in which no relevant rule was provided by conventional law’. Judge 
Shahabuddeen affirmed that ‘it was not necessary to locate elsewhere the independent existence of such 
principles of international law; the source of the principles lay in the Clause itself.’ Justice 408.. Judge 
Shahabuddeen finds that quite a number of the delegates at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference may indeed have 
intended that the Martens Clause possess this very powerful normative role in the laws of armed conflict. Justice 
409.. Judge Shahabuddeen’s position is strengthened and supported by the separate dissenting opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry in the same Advisory Opinion. Judge Weeramantry clearly suggests that the Martens Clause 
draws upon a ‘body of principles’ which lies ‘behind such specific rules as had already been formulated’ which 
ought ‘to be applied to such situations as had not already been dealt with by a specific rule’, International Court 
of Justice, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion’ [1996] I.C.J. Reports 226, 
484. For further discussion see also Antonio Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the 
Sky’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 187 
6 Michael N Schmitt, ‘The Environmental Law of War: An Invitation to Critical Reexamination’ (1996) 7 
United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies 237, 253.  
The principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience are the two key sources 
of regulation from which the Martens Clause identifies stop-gap legally binding rules to 
govern conduct on the battlefield. Of these two, the dictates of the public conscience is the 
least explored. Yet it perhaps has the greatest potential in the present day to put limits on the 
extent to which the environment is damaged in non-international armed conflict, until more 
specific treaty-based or customary international law rules are developed. Sir David Maxwell-
Fyfe, the United Kingdom’s prosecutor at Nuremberg, said that ‘[t]he law is a living thing. It 
is not rigid and unalterable. Its purpose is to serve mankind, and it must change and grow to 
meet the changing needs of society.’7 Sometimes, society can make their collective opinions 
felt so powerfully that the standards of conduct which are acceptable and unacceptable at any 
given time are abundantly clear. The Martens Clause serves mankind by allowing those clear 
expressions to shape the legal obligations of parties engages in an armed conflict where no 
international law otherwise exists.  
 
This article moves the debate on the Martens Clause forward by exploring key challenges 
which impede the widespread recognition of Martens Clause rules based on the dictates of the 
public conscience which protect the environment in non-international armed conflict. As 
such, this research lays the necessary foundation for future research and debates to take place 
on the precise nature and content of specific Martens Clause norms.  
 
Though focused on environmental protection in non-international armed conflict, the analysis 
of the dictates of the public conscience as a source of binding international law in this article 
is relevant throughout the laws of armed conflict: for example, the use of fully autonomous 
                                                          
7 Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Transcript of the Trial of The Major War Criminals before The International Military 
Tribunal "Blue Series", Nuremberg 28 August 1946, 172 
weapons8 or cyber warfare may well outpace legal regulation and the dictates of the public 
conscience may be drawn upon to identify Martens Clause rules to provide interim 
regulation.9  
 
Through this article, an understanding of the internal mechanics of the legal innovation 
represented by the Martens Clause - elevating the dictates of the public conscience into 
binding international law - may begin. This could herald a new age for the development of 
international law in general, one in which the will of states alone is no longer the sole creative 
force behind legally binding international rules. Martens Clause-style regulation could indeed 
be adopted in other fields of international law, such as in relation to environmental damage 
more broadly and in relation to climate change, where the slow development of law simply 
cannot keep pace with undesirable conduct.10 Anticipating an expansion in the reach of the 
Martens Clause as a source of regulation throughout international law, the analysis in this 
article is a crucial first step towards developing a more detailed understanding of the 
challenges which have existed thus far in identifying binding rules which are created through 
the dictates of the public conscience. 
 
1 The Dictates of the Public Conscience in the Martens Clause as they Apply to Non-
International Armed Conflict 
                                                          
8 See Tyler D Evans, ‘At War with the Robots: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Martens Clause’ 41 
Hofstra Law Review 697; Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘International Humanitarian Law and New Technology’ 
[2012] American Society of International Law Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 107; Stephen Goose, ‘The 
Case for Banning Killer Robots: Point’ (2015) 58 Communications of the ACM 43. 
9 Michael C. Horowitz, ‘Public opinion and the politics of the killer robots debate’ (2016) 3(1) Research & 
Politics 1 
10 Dinah Shelton and Alexandre Kiss, ‘A Martens Clause for Environmental Protection’ (2000) 30 
Environmental Policy and Law 285. 
 
Originally inserted into the Preamble of the Hague Convention II on the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land 1899, 11 it is from its proponent, Russian jurist F.F. de Martens12, that the Clause 
takes its name. The Martens Clause was originally intended ‘to ensure that negotiations were 
not deadlocked’13 on an issue over which states could not reach agreement: the legal ‘status of 
civilians who took up arms against an occupying force’.14  
 
It is ubiquitous when discussing the provision at the centre of this article to refer to the 
Martens Clause. However this implies that there is one single provision at play. Nothing could 
be further from reality. There are multiple versions of the Martens Clause to be found 
throughout the laws of armed conflict, each containing ever so slight modifications on 
previous versions. Five versions of the Martens Clause are identified in this section alone and 
four of these apply exclusively to international armed conflict. Only one version of the 
Martens Clause, the shortest and least detailed, applies to non-international armed conflict. 
The absence of references to international law in this version is not an impediment however, 
but rather, it is argued here, an endorsement that the dictates of the public conscience are 
indeed a source of binding rules on the battlefield. As the focus of this article is on identifying 
                                                          
11 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899 
12 For historical background on F.F. de Martens, see Dieter Fleck, ‘Friedrich von Martens: A Great International 
Lawyer from Pärnu’ 2 Baltic Defence Review 19.; TE Holland, ‘Frederic de Martens’ 10 Journal of the Society 
of Comparative Legislation 10.; Vladimir Vasilievich Pustogarov, ‘Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (1845-1909) - 
A Humanist of Modern Times’ (1996) 312 International Review of the Red Cross 300. 
13 Emily Crawford, ‘The Modern Relevance of the Martens Clause’ (2006) 6 ISIL Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian and Refugee Law 1, 19. 
14 Rupert Ticehurst, ‘The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict’ (1997) 317 International Review of 
the Red Cross 125. 
Martens Clause rules that apply in non-international armed conflict, the following discussion 
will explore some of the differences in the nuances between the four versions of the Martens 
Clause that apply to international armed conflict as they lay the foundation for the 
development of the version of the Martens Clause that applies in non-international armed 
conflict. 
 
The versions of the Martens Clause that are most frequently cited are from either the 1899 or 
1907 Hague Conventions. Both apply to what we now understand to be international armed 
conflict The original version of the Martens Clause was a preambular paragraph to the Hague 
Convention (II), and it was adopted in 1899 by unanimous vote.15 It read as follows: 
‘Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the 
requirements of the public conscience.’ 16 
 
The second version of the Martens Clause, again applying to international armed conflict, and 
again in preambular text, was included in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV.17 Some 
elements of the 1907 version of the Clause remain identical or very similar to the 1899 
                                                          
15 Michael Salter, ‘Reinterpreting Competing Interpretations of the Scope and Potential of the Martens Clause’ 
(2012) 17 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 403, 404. 
16 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899 
17 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 
version. For example, the ‘laws of humanity’ remains a common term between the 1899 and 
1907 versions of the Clause; ‘principles of international law’ in the 1899 version became 
‘principles of the laws of nations’ in 1907; and the ‘requirements of the public conscience’ in 
1899 became ‘the dictates of the public conscience’ in the 1907 version. However notable 
changes were nonetheless made in the short period of time between these two treaties. A 
significant departure occurred in the way that ‘usages established by civilised nations’ in the 
1899 version was changed to ‘usages established among civilized people’ by 1907. The effect 
of this modification is not insignificant, as it is less clear that ‘usages established among 
civilized people’ refers to customary and treaty-based laws developed by states in the 
traditional way under international law. Referring to ‘people’ instead of ‘nations’ in 1907 
bolsters the assertion made in this article that that popular collective practices across 
populations rather than representations of these practices by states alone could perhaps indeed 
be the source of binding rules under international law.18 Whether negotiators in 1907 fully 
intended such implications remains an open question.19  
 
A third version of the Martens Clause, applying once more to international armed conflict, 
was subsequently included in each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Many of the key 
phrases within the common paragraph resemble not the original 1899 version, but the 
modified 1907 version described immediately above. However the purpose and placement of 
the Clause had changed between 1907 and 1949. In 1899 and 1907 the Martens Clause was 
                                                          
18 This sentiment has recently been revived at the International Court of Justice in light of Judge Cançado 
Trinidade’s Concurring Opinion to the Order of the Court which decided to grant provisional measures in the 
Jadhav Case between India and Pakistan. See Concurring Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, Jadhav Case 
(India v Pakistan) 18 May 2017, International Court of Justice. 
19 See, for example the views of Theodor Meron in Theodor Meron ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of 
Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 78, 81. 
but a preambular paragraph. However in the 1949 Geneva Conventions the Martens Clause 
was included in the operative paragraphs of each treaty which dealt with denunciation. As a 
result, denunciation by a state of any one of the four 1949 Conventions would ‘in no way 
impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue 
of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among 
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.’20 A 
literal reading of the Martens Clause in this context appears to suggest that a body of binding 
regulations exists during armed conflict which states themselves have no role in shaping21 
and which could never be denounced or reserved. 
 
The fourth and fifth versions of the Martens Clause were included in the 1977 Additional 
Protocols. The fourth version appeared in Additional Protocol I,22 which applies to 
international armed conflict. In this treaty, the Clause was included as an operative paragraph 
within Article 1. In this version of the Clause ‘the usages established among civilized 
peoples’ which appeared in the 1907 and 1949 versions was changed to ‘established custom’. 
This new phrase echoed the original sentiment of the 1899 version of the Clause which 
referred to ‘the usages established by civilized nations’ and perhaps by doing so removed the 
                                                          
20 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 Art. 63.; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second 
Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 Art. 62.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 Art. 142.; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) 1949 (75 UNTS 
287) Art. 158. 
21 Jeffrey Kahn, ‘“Protection and Empire”: The Martens Clause, State Sovereignty, and Individual Rights’ 
(2016) 56 Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 27. 
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 Art. 1(2). 
inference of non-traditional international law-making by popular consensus that could have 
previously been implied. Also, while ‘dictates of the public conscience’ remained the same, 
the ‘laws of humanity’ became ‘principles of humanity’ in Additional Protocol I of 1977.  
 
States took a very different approach in 1977 when developing regulations for non-
international armed conflict. The fifth version of the clause, the only one to apply to non-
international armed conflict, and the main version considered in this article, appears as an 
‘emasculated version of the clause’23 in the preamble to Additional Protocol II. It reads as 
follows: 
‘[I]n cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the 
protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience’24 
 
This twenty-eight word version of the Clause contrasts starkly to the ‘sixty-nine word 
diplomatic solution’25 that first appeared in 1899. Of all four paragraphs to appear in the 
preamble to Additional Protocol II, the final clause – the Martens Clause – was the most 
controversial. Some states, wishing to minimise international legal regulation of their military 
                                                          
23 Theodor Meron, ‘Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 
Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict, Edited by  Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King and 
Ronald S. McClain, vol 69 (Naval War College 1996), 357.  
24 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609., Preamble 
25 Emily Crawford, ‘The Modern Relevance of the Martens Clause’ (2006) 6 ISIL Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian and Refugee Law 1, 19.  
conduct in matters they perceived to be internal and domestic26, did not want a Martens 
Clause provision to apply in non-international armed conflict at all.27 There was considerable 
debate as to the relevance of the Martens Clause in non-international armed conflict, though 
the view that ‘the demands of world opinion still have a great role to play as the sources of 
principles of international law...when written rules proved to be inadequate’28 ultimately 
prevailed.  
 
The absence of references to ‘the law of nations’ or international law in general in the 
Additional Protocol II version of the Martens Clause is notable.29 The recognition that the 
dictates of the public conscience provide protection in non-international armed conflict even 
where there was uncertainty about the applicability of customary international law strongly 
supports the argument in this article that the dictates of the public conscience are 
uncontroversial as sources of law on the battlefield and clearly capable of being used to 
identify binding legal rules in armed conflict. 
                                                          
26 Cassese describes this as ‘the recalcitrance of the States…in extensively regulating internal armed conflicts’ 
Antonio Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 187, 210.  
27 For drafting history of the Martens Clause in Additional Protocol II, see The Law of Non-International Armed 
Conflict: Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Martinus Nijhoff 1987).. It appears that of all four 
paragraphs to appear in the ultimate version of the preamble to Additional Protocol II, the final clause – the 
Martens Clause – was the most controversial and caused considerable debate as to its relevance in Protocol II, 
the appropriateness of its wording and the significance of the phrase ‘the dictates of the public conscience’. 
28 See Theodor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience’ (2000) 
94 American Journal of International Law 78, 83 at footnote 5 quoting the views of the Italian representative to 
the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1452 (1973), para 46 
29 William Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights 
in Chechnya’ 16 European Journal of International Law 741, 749–750.. It seems that states were deliberately 
reluctant to refer to customary international law in Additional Protocol II more generally, and the brevity of the 
Martens Clause in this instrument exemplifies this. 
 
The insertion of a very particular version of the Martens Clause in Additional Protocol II has 
particular relevance for the protection of the environment in non-international armed conflict. 
During the negotiation of Additional Protocol II, some delegations felt that ‘destruction of  
the environment  should  be  prohibited  not  only  in  international  but  also  in  internal  
conflicts.’30 An explicit provision was proposed by the Australian delegation, contained in 
draft Additional Protocol II as Article 28bis, which suggested protecting the environment in 
non-international armed conflict just as it was in international armed conflict in Articles 35(3) 
and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I.31 However other delegations were set against the 
inclusion of such a provision32 because of their general opposition to too much ‘foreign 
interference in internal affairs under cover of humanitarian concern’33 and because they felt 
that too many legally binding rules in non-international armed conflict would cause non-state 
armed groups to perceive the laws of armed conflict to be too difficult to understand and too 
                                                          
30 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) Volume XIV, 176 
31 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 Arts. 35(3) and 55(1). 
32 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) Volume XIV, 176, 413 para 55 
33 Sylvie S Junod, ‘Additional Protocol II: History and Scope’ (1983) 33 The American University Law Review 
29, 34;  Theodor Meron, ‘Comment: Protection of the Environment During Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 
Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict, Edited by  Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King and 
Ronald S. McClain, vol 69 (Naval War College 1996) 353. ‘[t]he sovereignty of States and their traditional 
insistence on maintaining maximum discretion in dealing with those who threaten their sovereign authority have 
combined to limit the reach of the law of war to non-international armed conflict.’ 
onerous to adhere to, ultimately disregarding Additional Protocol II in its entirety34 and 
forcing states to do the same. 35  
 
Support for draft Additional Protocol II as a whole appeared to be floundering at the eleventh 
hour due to these concerns. To prevent a situation of stalemate which would block the 
adoption of the treaty, the Pakistani Delegate to the Diplomatic Conference proposed a 
simplified version of Additional Protocol II with twenty-eight articles replacing the 
contentious forty-seven.36 Article 28bis protecting the environment was cut from the final 
draft. The Martens Clause was then inserted into Additional Protocol II to serve the same 
purpose in Additional Protocol II as it had in the Hague Convention (II) of 1899: to confirm 
that the absence of a prohibition on any issue did not mean the issue was unregulated. The 
dictates of the public conscience and the principles of humanity were used to rebut any future 
presumption that that unfettered environmental damage in non-international armed conflict 
was permitted. 
 
2 Understanding the ‘Dictates of the Public Conscience’ as a Source of Legally 
Binding International Law 
 
                                                          
34 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) Volume XIV, 176, 411 para 48 
35 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977) Volume XIV, 176, 411 para 48. They 
felt that ‘authorities in power might use the inability of the insurgents to conform to the detailed provisions of 
the Protocol as an excuse for not complying with the Protocol’ themselves. 
36 Sylvie S Junod, ‘Additional Protocol II: History and Scope’ (1983) 33 The American University Law Review 
29, 33 
Public opinion has been ‘so influential in our era’37 that to propose it as a source of binding 
legal regulations is not beyond the imagination of many. The value of a source of 
international law that recognises prevalent moral standards as binding laws of armed conflict 
is nonetheless at odds with the traditional understanding of how international law is made and 
what can be considered a source of that law under Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. However there is a widely held opinion amongst international 
scholars and judges that while state practice can convey public opinion, it should not be 
definitive of it nor the exclusive measure of what should be considered binding law on the 
battlefield.38 
 
The dissenting opinions of Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Weeramantry International Court 
of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons stand out as being 
singularly authoritative interpretations on the inner workings of the Martens Clause39 and 
particularly strong examples of judicial support for what Judge Weeramantry recognised as 
‘the need that strongly held public sentiments in relation to humanitarian conduct be reflected 
in the law.’40 Judge Shahabuddeen indicated that while the opinion of states was important, it 
                                                          
37Theodor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience’ (2000) 94 
American Journal of International Law 78, 84. 
38 See Concurring Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, Jadhav Case (India v Pakistan) 18 May 2017, 
International Court of Justice. 
39 Judith Gardam, ‘The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International Humanitarian Law’ 
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law, 359. 
40 International Court of Justice, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion’ [1996] 
I.C.J. Reports 226, 487. 
was relevant only to ‘[indicate] the state of the public conscience’41 not as conclusive proof 
of the existence or absence of a Martens Clause rules. 
 
Persuasive scholarly support comes from Ticehurst who argues that ‘international law should 
not reflect the views of the powerful military States alone. It is extremely important that the 
development of the laws of armed conflict reflect the views of the world community at 
large.’42 Sean McBride argues that sources of the dictates of the public conscience should not 
be limited to just state-supported expressions.43 Indeed Gardam asserts that the arguments 
before the Court at the time were intended to prove that the Martens Clause ‘was a means by 
which [international humanitarian law] could keep in step with new developments in 
community values that were not necessarily reflected in the opinion juris of states.’44 Weston 
asserts that ‘in this burgeoning human rights era especially, respecting an issue that involves 
potentially the fate of human civilisation itself, it is not only appropriate but mandated that 
                                                          
41 International Court of Justice, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion’ [1996] 
I.C.J. Reports 226, 410.  
42 Rupert Ticehurst, ‘The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict’ (1997) 317 International Review of 
the Red Cross 125 
43 Sean McBride, ‘The Legality of Weapons of Social Destruction’, Studies and Essays on International 
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, C. Swinarski (ed) (Martinus Nijhoff 
1984) 406.: ‘Many resolutions adopted by the general Assembly of the United Nations have, either directly or 
by inference, condemned completely the use, stockpiling, deployment, proliferation and manufacture or nuclear 
weapons. While such resolutions may have no formal binding effect in themselves, they certainly do represent 
‘the dictates of public conscience’ in the 20th century, and come within the ambit of the Martens Clause 
prohibition.’ 
44 Judith Gardam, ‘The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International Humanitarian Law’ 
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law, 359 
the legal expectations of all members of human society, official and non-official, be duly 
taken into account’.45  
 
In terms of proving the existence and substance of specific Martens Clause rules derived from 
the dictates of the public conscience, Judge Shahabuddeen stated that ‘the Martens Clause 
was intended to fill gaps left by conventional international law and to do so in a practical 
way.’46 He maintained that ‘[t]he task of determining the effect of a standard may be difficult, 
but it is not impossible of performance; nor is it one which a court of justice may flinch from 
undertaking where necessary.’47 He did stress however that the court ‘may [not] go on a 
roving expedition; it must confine its attention to sources which speak with authority.’48 
Nonetheless, Judge Shahabuddeen stopped short of identifying examples of authoritative 
sources which clearly prove the dictates of the public conscience with sufficient precision 
that would allow rules to be derived from them and enforced on the battlefield side by side 
with other more established laws of armed conflict. Judge Weeramantry felt that the dictates 
of the public conscience had been expressed with sufficient precision on the issue of nuclear 
weapons such that no uncertainty existed regarding the Martens Clause prohibition on these 
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weapons,49 yet he too failed to provide guidance on the types of authoritative sources that had 
informed and shaped his view.  
 
Looking to the Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons for preliminary 
guidance on the sources and degree of proof required to identify binding rules from the 
dictates of the public conscience provides few concrete answers. Could regional differences 
in Martens Clause norms exist, for example? 50 Is it enough to identify generalised sentiments 
regarding environmental damage around the world to deduce that certain levels of damage on 
the battlefield are unacceptable? Or should there be evidence of very specific public 
sentiments that condemn environmental damage in situations of non-international armed 
conflict in particular? Do the dictates of the public conscience have to be held unanimously 
across the populations surveyed? Or would majority views suffice? The dissenting opinions 
of Judges Shahabuddeen and Weeramantry simply do not go into this level of detail. 
Moreover the opinion of the Court’s majority preferred to simply acknowledge the 
‘continuing existence and applicability’51 of the Martens Clause in the laws of armed conflict 
– a statement which exerted little influence on the overall conclusions reached by the Court in 
that Advisory Opinion.52 This acknowledgement falls far short of explaining precisely how 
the Martens Clause remains relevant to the regulation on the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
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in times of armed conflict and it certainly provides no definitive judicial guidance to support 
the future identification of specific Martens Clause rules derived from the dictates of the 
public conscience.  
 
3 Reconciling the Dictates of the Public Conscience with the Principle of Legality 
under International Law 
 
To validly apply, Martens Clause rules derived from the dictates of the public conscience 
must adhere to the principle of legality under international law. Crawford cautions against 
trying to enforce unclear Martens Clause rules, as she maintains that  
‘[a]ny law, but especially a law pertaining to armed conflict, should retain a 
significant measure of predictability in interpretation and application. The 
battlefield is no place for ambiguous and amorphous rules.’53  
 
The laws of armed conflict form part of a sub-set of international law which applies directly 
to both states and individuals. Individuals that are subjects of international law54 are not 
expected to presume to the most logical or illogical conclusion what a rule of international 
law might require of them. Brownlie maintains that individuals are required to  
‘obey the law where it does exist, but [they have] no particular obligation where it 
does not. It is not up to individual citizens or businessmen to do the lawmakers’ 
job for them. For example, they have no duty to extend the scope of the law’s 
constraint (in accordance with common sense, morality, the spirit of the law, 
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social purposes, or anything else), if the sources of law do not disclose an 
unambiguous enactment to that effect.’55 
 
Waldron argues that ‘[i]n the absence of a clearly stated constraint laid down in a 
promulgated legal text (like an enacted rule or a well‐ known precedent), there is a 
presumption in favor of individual freedom.’56 To ensure that Martens Clause rules based on 
the dictates of the public conscience do not violate the principle of legality when applied to 
individuals and non-state actors, both the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege 
(no crime or punishment without law) and lex certa (legal certainty) need to be fully 
respected before determining that conduct is prescribed or that punishable acts exist.57 While 
some feel that the Martens Clause ‘is not to be nitpicked like a tax statute’,58 if it is to create 
legally binding obligations on the battlefield then the substance of any rules identified 
through it must necessarily be clear. 
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The principle of lex certa requires that ‘an offense be sufficiently specific […] to avoid any 
perception of arbitrariness’59 and to enable individuals to foresee in concrete terms what 
conduct is in compliance with and in violation of the law in question. Specificity and 
foreseeability are crucial in determining legal certainty60 as they inform subjects of 
international law where the boundaries of legality lie on the battlefield. 
 
The principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege ensures that individuals have the 
opportunity in advance to shape their conduct to the law as it stands. According to this 
principle, individuals cannot be punished or held accountable for failing to conform to an 
ambiguous, or perhaps even unknowable, standard. Although the principles of humanity were 
used to justify the prosecution of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg,61 the dictates of the 
public conscience have never been used as an enforceable standard of conduct in armed 
conflict. Using Martens Clause rules based on the dictates of the public conscience ‘may be 
dangerous’62 if individuals are likely to face some form of punishment for crossing a very 
difficult-to-determine legal boundary.63  
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For individuals or non-state armed groups to adhere to the law, they need to know what that 
law might be before their conduct has been carried out: Martens Clause rules need to be 
foreseeable, clear and certain to achieve this. If they are not, Martens Clause rules risk 
requiring individuals to comply with ambiguous standards, violating the principle of lex certa 
and also imposing penalties and punishments without law, which would violate the principle 
of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege.  
 
4 Obstacles to the Application of the Dictates of the Public Conscience as Binding Law 
to Protect the Environment in Non-International Armed Conflict 
 
There is no doubt about the extent to which ‘the public conscience of the international 
community has been strengthened and sensitised to a high degree in relation to environmental 
problems’64 in recent times. If we draw the widest possible parameters for determining what 
constitutes the dictates of public conscience, as Crawford does by asserting that “there is 
some scope to argue that the idea of ‘public conscience’ is akin to notions of ‘world 
opinion’”,65 the growing number of declarations, resolutions, and treaties concerning 
environmental protection at the local, regional and global levels indicate that the global 
public conscience as represented by states wishes to expand rather than limit the scope of 
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legal measures to protect the environmental.66 In fact, the growing global ‘environmental 
conscience’67 which ‘embraces prevention as opposed to cure’68 inherently respects the 
recognition of the ‘environment’s interdependency with the survival of humankind, and 
ultimately...the inherent value of the environment in and of itself.’69 Therefore there is strong 
evidence to indicate that the dictates of the public conscience have evolved in a general 
manner to embrace greater environmental protection at all times.  
 
Indeed the oral submissions of Australia70, Mexico71, Malaysia72, New Zealand73, Samoa74, 
Marshall Islands75, Solomon Islands76, Costa Rica77 and Zimbabwe78 to the International 
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Court of Justice in the context of the Advisory Opinion on the Threat and Use of Nuclear 
Weapons all recognised the existence of binding Martens Clause rules in general 
contemplation of the environmental damage caused by such weapons. Of all states to mention 
the Martens Clause in their submissions to the ICJ, only the USA79 expressly refuted the 
ability of the Martens Clause to legally prohibit conduct on the battlefield as such. 
 
Support for the existence of Martens Clause rules that in some way protect the environment 
in armed conflict is also unequivocal in the scholarly literature on this issue. As a result of the 
ineffective provisions protecting the environment in Additional Protocol I and the absence of 
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any environment-related provisions in Additional Protocol II,  the International Committee of 
the Red Cross maintain that the ‘validity [of the Martens Clause] in the context of the 
protection of the environment in time of armed conflict is indisputable.’80 Other experts 
acknowledge that while the existence of Martens Clause rules may attract controversy,81 the 
growing scholarly support for such rules that protect the environment in armed conflict must 
point towards their existence.82 While some scholars are reluctant to recognise Martens 
Clause-based environmental protection on the battlefield prior to the exponential growth in 
global environmental awareness characteristic of the late 1970s or early 1980s,83 many 
scholars agree that such prohibitions exist now in the present-day. However no scholar has 
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yet identified specific rules derived from dictates of the public conscience through the 
Martens Clause which prohibit environmental damage in non-international armed conflict.  
 
Public opinion constantly changes and evolves, and even within the field of international 
environmental law not all environmental damage is prohibited. Indeed, the laws of armed 
conflict that apply during international armed conflict do not prohibit all environmental 
damage either, only damage that is widespread, long-term and severe.84 Therefore it is 
difficult to describe clearly how, or indeed whether, the dictates of the public conscience have 
focused on the specific issue of environmental damage in non-international armed conflict in 
a way that is sufficiently precise and clear such that parties to a non-international armed 
conflict could know to shape their behaviour accordingly. 
  
Unlike public opinion on the issue of nuclear weapons, which Judge Weeramantry finds to be 
very clear, as ‘the conscience of the global community has spoken, and spoken often, in the 
most unmistakable terms’,85 there is no globally identifiable objection to environmental 
damage in non-international armed conflict. Huang, for example, suggests that the attack on 
the Jiyeh power station in Lebanon during the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 
‘[w]hile devastating to the environment […] probably did not violate the fundamental dictates 
of the public conscience.’86 Therefore asserting that the environment is protected in non-
international armed conflict by the Martens Clause does not seem to conform to the 
                                                          
84 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 Arts. 35(3) and Art. 55 
85 International Court of Justice, ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion’ [1996] 
I.C.J. Reports 226, 265 
86 Ling-Yee Huang, ‘2006 Israel-Lebanese Conflict: A Case Study for Protection of the Environment in Times 
of Armed Conflict’ (2008) 20 Florida Journal of International Law 103, 109–110. 
requirements of the principle of legality, including the principle of lex certa and nullum 
crimen mulla poena sine lege. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Martens Clause implies that the dictates of the public conscience may provide 
provisional but legally binding guidance through uncertain or unsettled legal terrain,87 
ensuring that gaps in positive law are ‘not sufficient excuse for immoral and inhuman acts, 
even in wartime, and even in the direst military necessity.’88 While the Martens Clause was 
initially an innovative ‘diplomatic tool to breach an impasse’,89 the central position it now 
occupies in the laws of armed conflict could represent the greatest paradox in the entire field 
of international law: instead of providing temporary stop-gap regulation, it may now be 
inhibiting prudent law-making, particularly on the issue of environmental protection in non-
international armed conflict.  
 
Unchallenged assertions that the environment in non-international armed conflict remains 
protected by the Martens Clause creates an illusion of legal regulation. From the analysis in 
this article, it is clear that confirming the existence of legally binding Martens Clause rules 
based on the dictates of the public conscience is extremely difficult. Without detailed 
guidance as to how the dictates of the public conscience can be proved, and to what degree 
the views need to be widely held, arguments invoking that the Martens Clause provides 
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protection in the absence of other laws creates a false sense of legal regulation. Beyond the 
smoke and mirrors of unverifiable claims of Martens Clause protection lies the enormous and 
difficult task of real law-making.  
 
As Kahn surmises, ‘“history reminds us that the purpose of the clause was not to end debate, 
but to forestall the worst consequences for civilian populations and belligerents that would 
result if the parties assumed that a lack of tight-fitting treaty law meant carte blanche 
freedom to act, unconstrained by any law.”90 The research in this article provides a starting 
point for a new wave of Martens Clause scholarship that focuses on how to substantiate and, 
ultimately, operationalize rules derived from the dictates of the public conscience, 
particularly rules relating to the protection of the environment, in order to enhance the clarity, 
certainty, breadth and relevance of the laws of non-international armed conflict going 
forward. 
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